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The energy industry is one of the most heavily subsidized industries in
America.1 Since the industrial revolution, the United States has largely re-
lied on fossil fuels to generate power. However, spurred by concerns over
climate change and pollution, as well as advances in technology, the energy
market is moving away from fossil fuels and toward renewable sources of
energy. According to the 2017 United States Energy and Employment Re-
port, employment in clean energy and energy efficiency is growing faster
than employment in fossil fuels.2 The scientific community agrees that
burning fossil fuels is the largest contributor to human-caused climate
change.3 Scientists and economists estimate that the effects of climate
change—which include increases in extreme weather patterns such as hurri-
* Candidate for J.D. 2020 at the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Mon-
tana. Thank you to Professor Sam Panarella for his mentorship, insight, and guidance through the writ-
ing process. Thank you to my friends and peers, the editors and staff of the Montana Law Review, for
their editorial work. Lastly, a huge thank you to my friends and family for their endless encouragement,
love, and support.
1. Ilaria Espa & Sonia E. Rolland, Subsidies, Clean Energy, and Climate Change, E15 TASK
FORCE ON RETHINKING INT’L SUBSIDIES DISCIPLINES, 3 (2015). Fossil fuels receive an average of $400 to
$600 billion annually. Id.
2. U.S. Energy and Employment Report, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 8–9 (Jan. 2017), https://perma
.cc/4QSR-3K5T.
3. Daniel B. Botkin, Global Warming: What It Is, What Is Controversial About It, and What We
Might Do In Response to It, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 119, 121 (1991).
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canes, polar vortexes, and rising sea levels—will cost the United States’
economy billions of dollars annually.4
While the science surrounding climate change is clear,5 the politics
and policies associated with the energy industry are muddy at best. Fossil
fuel companies spend millions of dollars annually on lobbying efforts, and,
consequenetly, politicians are sharply divided on how the energy industry
should develop and adapt to advances in science and technology.6 Regula-
tion of the energy industry is, and has always been, a politically contentious
issue. Throughout his campaign and tenure in the Oval Office, President
Trump has touted bringing back clean coal and pushed for the reopening
and resurgence of the American coal industry.7 However, the scientific
community agrees that burning coal is one of the primary contributors to
human-caused climate change.8
Nevertheless, most conservatives believe the abundance of fossil fuels
in America’s bedrock should be tapped and sold on the international market
to provide a major source of revenue and to encourage energy indepen-
dence.9 Liberals, on the other hand, remain focused on the looming threat of
climate change. While in office, President Obama was key in the United
States’ participation in major international energy cooperatives, like the
Paris Agreement—which President Trump almost immediately withdrew
from.10 In 2018, freshman House Democrat Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in-
troduced the highly controversial Green New Deal, which aims to reduce
the United States’ use of fossil fuels and create high-paying clean energy
jobs.11 Despite, or perhaps because of polarized visions on regulation of the
energy industry, fossil fuels enjoy the greatest amount of indirect and direct
4. Andrea Thompson, Here’s How Much Climate Change Could Cost the U.S., SCI. AM. (Dec. 3,
2018), https://perma.cc/B428-QP3T.
5. Scientists largely agree that the Earth is warming at a rate higher than normal because of human
activity. Thomas J. Crowley, Causes of Climate Change over the Past 1000 Years, SCI. 289, 270–75
(Jul. 14, 2000). Scientists also agree that burning fossil fuels that emit greenhouse gases is causing the
warming. Id.
6. Robert J. Brulle, The Climate Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis of Lobbying on Climate Change in
the USA, 2000 to 2006, CLIMATIC CHANGE 149 (2018). The politics behind purchasing natural resources
are very complicated, mostly because the Middle East is currently one of the largest suppliers of oil.
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained, EIA.GOV,
https://perma.cc/3T25-C8UA (Last visited, Jan. 2, 2020).
7. Meghan Keneally, What Trump Has Said About Clean Coal and What It Is, ABCNEWS (Aug.
23, 2017), https://perma.cc/D89Q-VC8B.
8. Crowley, supra note 5, at 270–75. R
9. Victor Davis Hanson, The Fracking Industry Deserves Our Gratitude, THE NAT’L REVIEW,
https://perma.cc/R68A-RGXJ (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
10. Camila Domonoske, So What Exactly Is In the Paris Climate Accord? NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June
1, 2017), https://perma.cc/6FYC-69KG.
11. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). Notably, this legislation is merely a resolution and makes
no changes to existing law.
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subsizization12 from the United States government and remain dominant in
the energy market.13
One significant financial benefit fossil fuel companies enjoy is their
ability to organize as Master Limited Partnerships. The Master Limited
Partnership (“MLP”) is an entity structured as a limited partnership that can
trade ownership units on a national stock exchange.14 Yet, the entity is not
subject to corporate taxation treatment like all other publicly-traded entities,
which means it only pays taxes at the ownership level rather than at both
the entity and ownership level.15 By imposing limits through the Internal
Revenue Code (“IRC”), Congress primarily allows fossil fuel companies to
reap the benefits of the MLP structure.16 The result is an indirect subsidy,
which, among many other existing subsidies, allows fossil fuel companies
to dominate the energy sector.17 In recent years, Congress has considered a
bill, the Master Limited Partnership Parity Act (“MLPPA”), that would al-
low renewable energy companies to also obtain MLP tax treatment.18 How-
ever, this legislation, as written, is nothing more than a starting place for
Congress. If the United States is ever going to adequately address climate
change, the renewable energy industry should, at a minimum, be afforded
the same benefits and opportunities as other competitors in the market. Ad-
ditionally, Congress should even consider eliminating the use of the MLP
by fossil fuel companies to shift the energy market in favor of renewables.
Montana could benefit significantly from investment in the renewable
energy industry.19 In Montana, the renewable energy sector is growing rap-
12. Fact Sheet: Fossil Fuel Subsidies: A Closer Look at Tax Breaks and Societal Costs, ENVTL.
AND ENERGY STUDY INST. (Jul. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/DX5Z-S2LU. Direct subsidies include: In-
tangible Drilling Costs Deduction (I.R.C. § 263), Percentage Depletion (I.R.C. § 613), and credits for
clean coal investment (I.R.C. § 48A).
13. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review February 2019, figure 1.2,
4.1; Espa & Rolland supra note 1, at 1. R
14. Suzanne B. Sutton, Tax Reform 1986 Fuels the Rise of the Master Limited Partnership, 9 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 217, 218–19 (1988).
15. Id. at 220–22.
16. See I.R.C. § 7704 (2018); Sutton, supra note 14, at 220–22. R
17. See Espa & Rolland supra note 1, at 3. R
18. See Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, S. 2005, 115th Cong. (2017).
19. Currently, Montana’s major coal-fired electricity plant, Colstrip, is set to close down half its
units by the end of 2019. Corin Cates-Carney, Colstrip Power Plant Units 1 and 2 To Close This Year,
MONT. PUB. RADIO (Jun. 11, 2019) https://perma.cc/8JGD-DERG. Further, it is estimated that the re-
maining units will close in the next ten years. Colstrip Part Owner Moves Up Timetable to Drop Power
Plant, Q2 NEWS (Oct. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/FR4Y-DRY4. The reason for these closures is because
PacifiCorp, a part-owner of the plant, has made commitments to move towards renewable energy. Id.
Renewable energy proponents in Montana say that Colstrip’s closure will open up more space on ex-
isting power lines to transmit more wind power to Washington and Oregon. Cates-Carney, supra note
19. R
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idly and is quickly becoming a major industry for the state.20 Specifically,
Montana’s geography makes it a leading state in wind energy potential.21
Currently, there are around 500 commercial wind turbines in Montana, as
well as a number of projects set for development in the next few years.22
Montana also has 23 utility-grade hydroelectric power plants.23 Develop-
ment of more renewable energy projects could boost Montana’s economy
and become a major source of industry in the state.
This comment explores MLPs in their role as a fossil fuel industry
subsidy and their possible use to spur growth and development in the re-
newable energy sector. Part II of this comment explores the historic and
contemporary structure and purpose of the MLP, focusing on how the MLP
is advantageous from a tax and capital-raising perspective. Part III analyzes
the proposition that renewable energy companies should be allowed to or-
ganize as an MLP, including the proposed MLPPA and its possible effects
on the energy sector. Finally, I propose that renewable energy production
and storage companies be allowed to organize as MLP’s and that fossil fuel
companies be phased out of the MLP structure via individual plans.
Together, these small changes to the IRC supply a market-based ap-
proach that could help the United States move towards creating a more
sustainable energy sector. Importantly, the MLP structure is merely a piece
of the energy market in the United States, and any changes to existing law
are unlikely to cause major shifts in that market. Therefore, the proposal
this comment utlimately advances is unlikely to solve the issue of climate
change alone, and the United States will need to consider more impactful
legislation to if it is to curb the emission of greenhouse gases and fend off
the dangers presented by climate change. Nontheless, the MLP remains an
effective energy subsidy that could encourage a market shift away from
fossil fuels and towards renewable energy.
II. THE EVOLUTION AND PURPOSE OF THE MASTER
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Business owners choose between a variety of organizational structures
when forming their business. The two primary organizational structures that
energy companies can choose between are corporations and limited partner-
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ships.24 The corporate structure is ideal for raising low-cost capital, as cor-
porations can easily sell ownership shares and may eventually trade on the
national market. However, the IRC subjects corporate entities to taxation at
two levels.25 First, the IRC assesses tax at the entitiy level on a corporations
net profits.26 Second, the corporation’s shareholders pay tax, often at prefer-
ential rates, on their dividends and appreciation in value upon sale.27 The
result is two levels of taxation on entities organized as corporations.
Limited partnerships, on the other hand, pay income tax only at the
investor or limited partner level.28 Rather than paying a corporate income
tax, limited partnerships pass their income directly to their investors or lim-
ited partners, which is commonly referred to as pass-through taxation.29 By
avoiding the entity-level taxes assessed on corporations, pass-through taxa-
tion provides significant savings for the organization (and greater profits for
the organization’s owners and investors).30 While most limited partnerships
are not publicly traded companies, some do trade ownership units on na-
tional stock exchanges. But in taking advantage of whatever benefits na-
tional stock exchanges provide, limited partnerships remain subject to en-
tity-level taxation—unless they qualify as an MLP.31
Congress did not create the first MLP; rather, clever corporate lawyers
looking to decrease their tax liability and create greater returns on invest-
ment did. The Apache Petroleum Company (“Apache”), an independent oil
and gas producer, created the first MLP when it consolidated its drilling
operation partnerships in 1981.32 This was, in part, a result of the Economic
Recovery Act of 1981 increasing the corporate tax rates, making them less
favorable than pass-through tax rates.33 As a result, it became more benefi-
cial for investors to pay ordinary income tax rates assesed on pass-through
entity ownership rather than corporate income taxes at the entity level, then
capital gains rates on the appreciation of shareholder value at the investor
24. David C. Magagna, Congress, Give Renewable Energy a Fair Fight: Passage of the Master
Limited Partnership Parity Act Would Give Renewable Energy the Financial Footing Needed to Inde-
pendently Succeed, 27 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 149, 154–55 (2016).
25. I.R.C. § 11(a); FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § 6953. (WESTLAW
2019).
26. I.R.C. § 301.
27. Id. For most stock in publicly-traded companies, shareholders pay capital gains rates on both
dividends and appreciation in value upon sale. Dividends that get this preferential treatment are called
Qualified Dividends. For a more robust discussion of qualified vs. ordinary dividends see Investment
Income and Expenses I.R.S. Pub. 550 (2018).
28. I.R.C. § 701.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 7704.
32. Apache Corp., About Apache—1980s, APACHECORP.COM, https://perma.cc/3S5Q-ACD5 (last
visited Mar. 13, 2019).
33. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
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level.34 Under this structure, Apache could take advantage of the capital
raising and liquidity benefits of being publicly traded while maintaining a
pass-through partnership taxation structure.35 Thus, taking into account the
taxation methods, their investors had greater returns on investment. Follow-
ing in Apache’s footsteps, several corporations began to reorganize as
MLPs, including hotels, sports teams, and amusement parks.36
In 1987, Congress placed severe restrictions on what kind of compa-
nies could organize as an MLP, citing concerns that companies might use
the structure to avoid corporate taxes.37 Congress thus enacted I.R.C.
§ 7704, which treats publicly-traded partnerships and their investors as cor-
porations for tax purposes, resulting in the assessesment of normal corpo-
rate income taxes.38 However, Congress created several exceptions that al-
low most publicly-traded fossil fuel limited partnerships to maintain pass-
through taxation. These entities are today’s MLPs, a function of I.R.C.
§ 7704(c).39 Under subsection (c), the corporate treatment of publicly-
traded partnerships does not apply if 90% of their income meets the defini-
tion of “qualifying income” under the statute.40 “Qualifying income” is de-
fined as income and gains derived from a variety of natural resource-related
sources, including many of the activities in which fossil fuel companies
engage.41 The result is significant tax savings combined with  a public-own-
ership structure.
The MLP combines the capital-raising advantages of a corporation
with the tax benefits of a limited partnership. Structurally, an MLP is a
34. Here, it is crucial to take into consideration the various level and rates of taxation that are at
play. Corporate shareholders are taxed at capital gains rates on their shareholder interests, while partner-
ship interests are taxed at income tax rates. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1). When corporate tax rates are very low,
investors and entities are subjected to less taxation when calculating the total taxes paid at both levels.
35. Matthew J. McCabe, Master Limited Partnerships’ Cost of Capital Conundrum, 17 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 319, 322 (2014). Apache combined thirty drilling limited parnerships, and each of the limited
partnerships contributed all their interests into the MLP and received a limited partnership interest in the
MLP. Id.
36. Id. at 160.
37. H.R. 3545 100th Cong. (1987); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1303, § 10211 (1987); E. Cabell Massey, Master Limited Partnerships: A Pipeline to Renewable
Energy Development, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2016).
38. I.R.C. § 7704(a). The general rule under 7704(a) provides that “a publicly traded partnership
shall be treated as a corporation,” except as provided for in subsection (c)—which is the applicable
statute that creates the Master Limited Partnership.
39. Id. § 7704(c), (d).
40. Id. § 7704(c)(1)-(2).
41. Id. § 7704(c)(2). The qualifying income statute specifically includes: “income and gains de-
rived from the exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining, transportation (in-
cluding pipelines transporting gas, oil, or products thereof), or the marketing of any mineral or natural
resource (including fertilizer, geothermal energy, and timber), industrial source carbon dioxide, or the
transportation or storage of any fuel described in subsection (b), (c), (d), or (e) of section 6426, or
any alcohol fuel defined in section 6426(b)(4)(A) or any biodiesel fuel as defined in section 40A(d)(1).”
Id. § 7704(d)(1)(E).
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limited partnership, which requires a general partner to own at least two
percent of the business and be personally liable for its obligations.42 Lim-
ited partners can invest in the company and receive what are called “com-
mon units,” but they are only liable for the company’s obligations to the
extent of their investment.43 Most importantly, investors can trade common
units on national exchanges like corporations can with shares, and the in-
vestors pay ordinary income taxes on the appreciation and returns on own-
ership.44 As discussed above, the largest advantage of existing as a limited
partnership is that MLPs do not pay entity-level income taxes.45 As a result
of lower tax liability, most MLPs have the liquidity to consistently pay divi-
dends to their investors and to produce steady returns on investments, giv-
ing the entity a broader investment pool as unit holders are sure to benefit
from their ownership in immediate returns.46
Often, MLPs act as holding companies for oil and gas extraction
projects.47 In other words, developers will sell their already operational
projects to an MLP that owns several other projects. Because of the capital-
raising benefits of the MLP, these entities have more working capital to
purchase projects with, and developers can sell operational projects and use
the funds to develop even more projects. In short, the advantages resulting
from fossil fuel companies’ ability to organize as an MLP cannot be under-
stated. Congress’ acquiseance to fossil fuel companies organizing as MLPs
constitutes an explicit subsidy unavailable to renewable energy compa-
nies.The result, is an energy market skewed towards fossil fuel companies.
In the following section, this comment advocates for a solution in which
renewable energy companies can avail themselves to the MLP structure.
III. IMPROVING THE CHANCES OF RENEWABLES IN THE ENERGY MARKET
Incentives provided to renewable energy companies generally pale in
comparison to the advantages enjoyed by fossil fuel companies through the
MLP structure.48 At the time of the 1987 MLP reform, Congress did not
sufficiently appreciate renewables as a major source of energy in the United
42. Magagna, supra note 24, at 158 n.80. Generally, the general partner in an MLP is some organi- R
zation or corporation—it is unusual that an individual would be named as the general partner. McCabe,
supra note 35, at 323. R
43. McCabe, supra note 35, at 323–24. Common units are the equivalent of stock in a C corpora- R
tion.
44. Robert J. Haft, Peter M. Fass, Michele Haft Hudson, & Arthur F. Haft, TAX-ADVANTAGED
SECURITIES § 10:473 (Westlaw 2019).
45. I.R.C. § 7704(c)(1).
46. Magagna, supra note 24, at 149. R
47. See McCabe supra note 35, at 326. R
48. Magagna, supra note 24, at 149. R
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States.49 As a result, fossil fuel MLPs pay significantly less in taxes than
publicly-traded renewable energy corporations. Further, fossil fuel compa-
nies are rarely held financially responsible for climate change and its devas-
tating effects on the economy and environment, despite the direct correla-
tion between burning fossil fuels and climate change.50
This explicit subsidization from the United States government, as well
as a lack of financial accountability, renders fossil fuel companies a better
investment with less financial downside when compared to a renewable en-
ergy company. Moving forward, Congress should rely on the renewable
energy industry to spur United States economic competition and develop-
ment in the global energy sector while curbing the effects of climate
change. As taxpayers will primarily bear the costs associated with climate
change, the United States can no longer afford to exempt fossil fuel compa-
nies from entity-level taxation. Congress should begin phasing fossil fuels
out of the MLP structure, and instead allow renewable energy companies to
take advantage of it.
Although renewable energy companies receive tax benefits of their
own, they miss out on one significant advantage the MLP structure grants
fossil fuel companies—better opportunities to raise capital. Renewable en-
ergy companies are allowed tax benefits via the Production Tax Credit
(“PTC”), Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”), and accelerated depreciation.51
The PTC is a program that offers tax credits for renewable energy genera-
tion based on a per kilowatt-hour production.52 The ITC is a tax credit for
qualifying costs that renewable energy projects are eligible for as soon they
begin commercial operations.53 However, tax credits are only advantageous
if a company already has the tax liability to offset the applicable credits. On
average, renewable energy companies take around ten years to recover their
expenditures and actually use the PTC or the ITC to reduce their tax liabil-
ity.54 Further, the ITC and PTC are set to phase out significantly by 2021.55
49. Id.
50. Douglas Starr, Just 90 Companies are to Blame for Most Climate Change, this ‘Carbin Ac-
countant’ Says, SCIENCE MAGAZINE, https://perma.cc/6ML4-AA6U (Aug. 25, 2016). In other words,
most energy companies are not held responsible for the harm that emitting greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere causes. In response to this, some legislators have proposed a “carbon tax” that taxes a
company’s emissions. Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon Tax: The Introduction of the Carbon-
Burned Tax (CBT), 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 221 (1992).
51. Massey, supra note 37 at 1026–27.
52. I.R.C. § 45. Further Analysis of the IRC. See also Mitchell Menaker, Derek Kershaw, Simon
Letherman, Iain Scoon, Clean Energy Sector Tax Incentives in the US and UK, 23 INT’ L TAX REV. 47
(2012).
53. I.R.C. § 48. The Investment Tax Credit allows a credit for any taxable year and is the energy
percentage of the basis of each energy property that was placed into service during that taxable year.
Generally, 30% of the energy property qualifies. Id. § 48(a)(3).
54. Massey, supra note 37, at 1027.
55. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 40409, 132 Stat. 64, 150 (2018).
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Renewable energy companies experience similar tax liability problems with
accelerated depreciation.56 Taking greater depreciation deductions does lit-
tle to help renewables raise capital when their tax liability is likely unable to
support the deductions until well into the life-cycle of a project.57 While
these tax-equity investment programs are undoubtedly beneficial, they do
not provide the ability to secure low-cost capital like the MLP structure
does by promoting public investment.58
A. Renewables in the Current Market
The renewable energy market has seen significant growth in the past
few decades.59 In fact, the global renewable energy market is poised to
grow at 8.53% between 2019 and 2027.60 Like any business, however, se-
curing funding to initiate a project or development poses major challenges.
Typically, renewable companies will set up a network of single project enti-
ties, then sell them to holding companies after they become operational.61
One popular vehicle for this structure is the limited liability company,
which allows projects to obtain nonrecourse debt from banks and institu-
tional lenders while maintaining pass-through taxation.62 Nonrecourse debt
acts like a traditional loan from a bank or financial institution that shields
the borrower from having any personal liability for repayment.63 In other
words, the organization itself is liable for the debt, and the person or organi-
zation who owns the company is generally not liable for the company’s
financial obligations.
In reality, most projects do not secure funding through a single type of
financing. Many large-scale projects are financed by a mixture of nonre-
course debt and equity investors, who provide funding and receive owner-
ship shares in return.64 Due to the nature of renewable energy projects,
some renewable company investors supply capital solely for tax equity,
which allows the investor to take advantage of a company’s otherwise un-
56. Magagna, supra note 24, at 164. R
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Dr. Faith Birol, Renewables 2018: Market Analysis and Forecast 2018 to 2023, INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY AGENCY, (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
60. Renewable Energy Market: 2019 Size, Potential Growth, Trends, Share Analysis, Regional
Outlook, Sales, Revenue, Which Global Industry Forecast to 2027, MARKETWATCH (May 2, 2019),
https://perma.cc/L5YK-NZVC.
61. Richard L. Ottinger & John Bowie, Innovative Financing for Renewable Energy, 32 PACE
ENVTL. REV. 701, 742 (2015).
62. I.R.C. § 701; Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 442 (1991).
63. Nonrecourse Loan, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
64. Brian H. Potts, Tax Equity Financing for Utilities: Another Helping of Renewable Energy, But
Hold The Tax Credits, FORBES (Jul. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/3L2F-YXNC.
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used tax credits.65 Tax equity investors are typically large corporations with
sizeable taxable incomes looking to take advantage of tax credits or deduc-
tions they would otherwise not be entitled to.66
Currently, some renewable developers and companies have created
what is referred to as a YieldCo.67 A YieldCo is a publicly traded corpora-
tion that owns and operates solar and wind projects.68 A YieldCo and an
MLP serve similar purposes structurally. Much like the MLP, renewable
energy project developers will sell their operational projects to YieldCo
companies, which allows the developer to use the sale proceeds to fund
further projects.69 However, YieldCos operate at a disadvantage to fossil
fuel MLPs for several reasons. Most critically, they are subjected to in-
creased tax liability. Like any other corporation, YieldCos pay taxation at
the entity and investor levels.70
For example, SolarCity, a publicly-traded corporation that manufac-
tures and installs solar panels, has a similar market capitalization to Mid-
stream, a fossil fuel MLP.71 At its initial public offering, Midstream raised
$920 million, before subsequently investing those funds in crude oil pipe-
lines.72 However, as a result of Midstream’s MLP structure, these two com-
panies enjoy starkly different investment profiles.73 SolarCity pays corpo-
rate taxes and does not pay cash dividends on its stock, partly as a result of
its additional tax liability. Midstream, on the other hand, pays dividends to
its limited partners yearly.74
As a result, Midstream remains the obvious choice for investors look-
ing to receive annual dividends. Therefore, if SolarCity had the same MLP
structure, it would theoretically be a viable investment alternative to Mid-
stream, while also generating capital for even more renewable energy ven-
tures. The comparison between Midstream and SolarCity illustrates how
Congress could spur investment in renewables by expanding the MLP
structure to include companies in the renewable energy generation and stor-
age industry. Some members of Congress have taken note of this, and on a
four separate occasions, have introduced the MLPPA, which would allow
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 61, at 742. R
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. I.R.C. § 11.
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renewable energy companies to organize as MLPs.75 Unfortunately, it has
never reached a full vote in either chamber of Congress.76
Legislation supporting renewable energy companies inevitably faces
an uphill battle and strong opposition from well-connected fossil fuel lob-
byists on Capitol Hill. Unsurprisingly, not all members of Congress believe
that the MLP should be expanded to include renewable energy companies.77
Some members of Congress argue that sufficient tax subsidies already exist
for renewables.78 As such, allowing renewables to organize as MLPs would
further decrease the amount of tax the renewable energy industry contrib-
utes to the United States tax base and serve to increase the deficit.79 The
Joint Committee on Taxation reported that the MLPPA would cost the fed-
eral government $1.3 billion over ten years; for context, the 2019 budget
alone is around 4.4 trillion dollars.80
It must be noted, however, that these numbers pale in comparison to
the costs associated with climate change. The Environmental Protection
Agency and other federal agencies use the “Social Cost of Carbon” as a
policy tool to attach a dollar figure to costs associated with the burning of
fossil fuels.81 Essentially, it “is a measure, in dollars, of the long-term dam-
age done by a ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in a given year.”82
Generally, the cost increases over time as the effects of climate change
worsen.83 The Congressionally-mandated National Climate Assessment Re-
port currently estimates that climate change will cost the United States’
economy half of a trillion dollars annually by 2090.84
Despite the immense costs of climate change, the MLPPA is mostly
unpopular with fiscal conservatives, who claim to have a careful eye on the
ever-expanding national deficit.85 Further, there are significant political
75. See Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, S. 3275, 112th Cong. (2012); Master Limited Part-
nerships Parity Act, S. 795, 113th Cong. (2013); Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, S. 1656, 114th
Cong. (2015); Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, S. 2005, 115th Cong. (2017).
76. Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, S. 2005, 115th Cong. (2017).
77. The MLPPA has been introduced four times but has never left committee. Dino Grandoni, The
Energy 202: Tax Debate Opens Door For Renewables to Get Same Break As Fossil Fuels, THE WASH-
INGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/29VC-A2J6.
78. Id.
79. Currently, renewable energy companies that could organize as MLPs are organized as
YieldCos, which pay corporate taxes. Therefore, should a YieldCo reorganize as an MLP, that company
would no longer pay such taxes, resulting in the Treasury taking in less tax revenue.
80. Id.
81. The Social Cost of Carbon, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://per
ma.cc/SJ78-RF9S (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Fourth National Climate Assessment, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM (2018),
https://perma.cc/RGW9-MLV4.
85. Grandoni, supra note 77. Of note, these fiscal conservatives have largely ignored the deficit R
since President Trump was elected in 2016. Indeed, the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, passed with overwhelming
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consequences associated with legislation-based investments in renewable
energy.86 Fossil fuel companies spend millions on lobbying efforts and
electioneering, and thus are significantly more established and successful
policy influencers.87 In 2016, oil and gas companies contributed $103 mil-
lion for electioneering and $120 million on lobbying efforts.88 Renewables,
however, spent only $4.7 million in electioneering and $20.9 million on
lobbying.89 Like any newcomer, renewables simply do not have the same
kind of stronghold in Washington, nor do they have as many allies in Con-
gress.90 This creates a massive hurdle for meaningful legislation aimed at
creating a better renewable energy market.
Despite pushback from special interest groups and fossil fuel compa-
nies themselves, renewables are on the rise in the world market and remain
an important topic of discussion between world leaders.91 The 2015 Paris
Climate Accord (“Paris Accord”) is an international cooperative aimed at
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and preventing the global temperature
increase from exceeding 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial tempera-
tures.92 Currently, 187 parties have ratified the Paris Accord (including
Germany and the United States), all of whom agreed that climate change
poses a major threat to the modern world.93 Germany is considered one of
the world’s biggest renewable energy leaders. During one week in March
2019, renewable energy powered nearly 65% of the country’s electricity.94
Republican support in 2017, is estimated to expand the nationl deficit by $1,456 billion over the period
from 2018 to 2027. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 1, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE, https://perma.cc/2QZU-3K3J (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
86. For example, the fossil fuel industry spends millions of dollars on lobbying on the issue of
climate change. Additionally, 87% of political election spending by the fossil fuel industry has gone to
Republican candidates. OpenSecrets.org: The Center for Responsive Politics, Oil & Gas: Long-term
Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://perma.cc/8U2J-2B2L (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
87. Robert J. Brulle, The Climate Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis of Lobbying Spending on Climate
Change in the USA, 2000 to 2016, 149 CLIMATE CHANGE 289 (2018); OpenSecrets.org: The Center for
Responsive Politics, supra note 86.
88. OpenSecrets.org: The Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 86; OpenSecrets.org: The
Center for Responsive Politics, Oil & Gas: Lobbying, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://perma.cc/FN32-9QAR
(last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
89. OpenSecrets.org: The Center for Responsive Politics, Alternative Energy Production & Ser-
vices: Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://perma.cc/6DGR-QD2N (last visited
Sept. 10, 2019); Opensecrets.org: The Center for Responsive Politics, Alternative Energy Production &
Services: Lobbying, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://perma.cc/D3VK-VB86 (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
90. OpenSecrets.org: The Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 89. R
91. Global Renewable Energy Market Set to Grow as Traditional Energy Sources Dwindle,
FINANCIALBUZZ.COM (Sept. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/D548-DYSC.
92. Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16–1104 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016) [here-
inafter Paris Accord].
93. Id.; Paris Agreement: Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS: CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma
.cc/49NW-WL36 (Last Visited Jan 2, 2020).
94. Tony Webster, Renewables Generated a Record 65 Percent of Germany’s Electricity Last
Week, YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Mar. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/WGK6-CSLE.
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON104.txt unknown Seq: 13 31-MAR-20 9:37
2020 MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 109
These staggering numbers are in part due to Germany’s focus on creating a
robust renewable energy sector.95 Although the United States has begun the
process of withdrawing from its promises under the Paris Accord, other
countries are stepping up to achieve its goals.96 If the United States wishes
to meaningfully compete in a changing global energy market, Congress
needs to reconsider its approach to the taxation of renewable energy compa-
nies.97
Regardless of whether he United States’ participates in resolutions like
the Paris Accord or other climate change agreements, the world agrees—the
energy market is moving away from fossil fuels.98 The United States has
two options moving forward: (1) continue investing in fossil fuels and risk
falling behind the global energy industry; or (2) begin investing in renew-
ables and lead the market in developing and creating cleaner sources of
energy. This comment adovcates for the latter proposition.
B. The MLPPA and Phase-out of Fossil Fuels
Some academics have proposed that the MLP be eliminated entirely.99
However, there is significant concern that eliminating the MLP would cre-
ate a volatile and unstable energy market.100 Several large energy compa-
nies, such as Midstream, are currently organized as MLPs, and most major
MLPs rely on their current structure to operate and generate investment
capital.101 Outright elimination of the structure could create significant
problems for these companies and the many investors who rely on MLPs
for consistent returns on their investments.102 An abrupt change could have
a domino effect on other industries which rely on MLPs for consistent in-
vestment returns. Further, the structure has proven itself useful to promote
investment in the fossil fuel industry; those same benefits could prove use-
ful for promoting growth in the renewable energy industry. Expanding the
MLP definition of “qualifying income” to include renewable energy
projects would be a useful tool to help developers sell and finance renewa-
95. Id.
96. JuliaRosen, Here’s How 6 Countries are Stepping up to Meet the Paris Climate Goals, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/5LHB-BS4X.
97. Mijin Cha, Government Should Invest in Renewables and Clean Energy, MIC (Dec. 12, 2011),
https://perma.cc/HUC7-9DTG.
98. Somini Sengupta, The Paris Accord Promised a Climate Solutions. Here’s Where We Are Now,
NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/D8G2-4EEB.
99. David Powers, Fighting The Wrong Fight: Why the MLP Parity Act is a Misguided Attempt at
Achieving Renewable Energy Capital Raising Party, 17 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 30 (2016).
100. Id.
101. Ben Reynolds, Aristofanis Papadatos, Nick McCullum, 2019 List of All Publicly Traded MLPs:
Your Master Limited Partnership Investing Guide, SURE DIVIDEND, https://perma.cc/4D38-DFKX (last
visited Mar. 14, 2019).
102. Powers supra note 99, at 33. R
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ble energy projects more quickly. The structure, because of its consistent
returns on investment, would provide an incentive for public investment in
renewable energy infrastructure.
As previously noted, the notion that renewables should be able to or-
ganize as MLPs is not new. In fact, the MLPPA has been introduced by
Delaware Senator Chris Coons four times, including in 2012,103 2013,104
2015,105 and 2017.106 The MLPPA would function as an amendment to IRC
§ 7704, by including several renewable energy sources and storage in the
definition of “qualifying income.”107 The legislation, as proposed, is broad
and would encompass most kinds of renewable energy generation, develop-
ment, and storage projects.108 Nothing in the MLPPA prevents fossil fuel
companies from continuing to organize and maintain the MLP structure.109
Unfortunately, the bill has never survived committee,110 but it is likely to be
introduced again, hopefully with more support. Although the MLPPA is a
step in the right direction, it does not address the current national reliance
on fossil fuels as a source of energy. While this economic reality is beyond
the scope of this comment, it remains clear that he MLPPA is alone insuffi-
cient to completely shift the energy market away from fossil fuels and to-
wards renewable energy.
Congress should seriously consider adopting a version of the MLPPA
that would incentivize renewables and stop subsidizing fossil fuels. To im-
prove the chances of renewable energy in the market, Congress should first
amend IRC § 7704(c) to include renewable energy sources and storage in
the definition of “qualifying income.” Essentially, this would mean passing
the MLPPA. Renewable energy YieldCos and other companies could then
take advantage of the MLP structure and avoid entity-level taxation, likely
resulting in more investment from the public because MLPs yield greater
returns for their common unit holders. Through simple reorganization, most
YieldCos and emerging renewable energy companies would likely transi-
tion into the MLP structure. This would give renewable MLPs more access
to capital, allowing them to purchase and operate additional projects. Ac-
cess to more capital would allow developers to turn their projects around
faster, spurring growth in the industry.
Adopting the MLPPA merely gives renewables equal footing with fos-
sil fuels, which is not enough to meaningfully promote a renewable energy-
103. Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, S. 3275, 112th Cong. (2012).
104. Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, S. 795, 113th Cong. (2013).
105. Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act, S. 1656, 114th Cong. (2015).
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based sector. Rather, Congress should reverse the situation by phasing out
fossil fuel companies’ use of the MLP structure and disallowing the crea-
tion of any new MLPs that are not renewable energy companies. To avoid
an unstable energy market, this phase-out should take place over a long
enough period to allow for current MLPs to divest their fossil fuel projects
and invest in renewable energy projects. Of course, not all existing MLPs
will find it economically feasible to convert the requisite amount of income
to renewables, which require the company to pay entity-level taxes.111
Since there are less than 200 existing MLPs,112 all with very different port-
folios, it would be challenging to define a blanket phase-out period. There-
fore, Congress should require current MLPs who wish to continue under the
structure to develop and submit a transition plan to the Department of En-
ergy. These plans would outline how each company will divest its interests
in fossil fuel projects and invest in the production of renewable energy stor-
age or production in order to remain organized as an MLP. A customized
approach to this transition gives current MLPs the best chance for a suc-
cessful investment in the global renewable energy sector.
Transitioning fossil fuels out of the MLP structure is not a catch-all
solution and is unlikely to result in a total, or even a significant, market
shift away from fossil fuels. To adequately combat climate change, Con-
gress must take more significant steps in regulating greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Further, some existing MLPs may decide it is more economically
efficient to pay entity-level taxes rather than divest their fossil fuel projects.
This would increase tax revenue generated from fossil fuel companies,
which Congress could use to offset the future costs of climate change.
While this result may not directly benefit the renewable energy sector, it
does incentivize and promote public investment in renewable energy devel-
opment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Renewable energy is the future. The United States should keep this in
mind when it scrutinizes existent energy market subisidies, such as the
MLP structure available to fossil fuel companies. Congress should pass leg-
islation that would allow renewable energy companies and projects to take
advantage of the MLP structure. Further, such legislation should require
existing MLPs to divest their fossil fuel interests and invest in renewable
energy projects, or lose their ability to reap the rewards of the MLP struc-
ture. It is unlikely that this legislation will be a catch-all solution to the
111. Currently, § 7704(a) imposes corporate tax rates on all publicly-traded corporations. MLPs who
chose not to convert will simply be subjected to § 7704 taxation. I.R.C. § 7704(a).
112. Reynolds, Papadatos, McCullum, supra note 101.
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United States’ dependence on fossil fuels, nor will it eliminate the threat of
climate change. Nonetheless, it is a step in the renewable direction, and a
step toward the future.
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